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���������� ����� ������ ������ �� ��� ������ �� ����� ����� ������� ������� �� �������� ����������� �������. ���� ������ ������ ����� ����� ����� ���� ���� ������ ����� ������ �� ����� ��������. ��� ����� ��� �� ����� ������� �� ����� ���� ������� ��������� ���� ���� ���� ����� ����� ����� ��������. ��� �������� ���� ���� ���� ����� ���� ��� �������� �� ���� ������ �� ����� �� ����� ���������� ��� ����� ��������� ��� ���� ������. ��� ����� ��� ������ ����� ���������� �� ����ӡ �� ���� ��� ����� �������� ���� �������� ������ �������� �������� ���ߡ ��� ����� ���������� ����� �� ����� ����� ������� ���������� ������� ������ ������ ������ �� ���� ������� �������. ������� ��� ������� ������� ���� ������ ����� �������� �� ���������� ������ɡ �� ���� �� ��� ����� ���������� �� ���� ������ �� ���� ���� ���� ����� ������� �������� ��������. ������ ���� �������� ��������� �������� - ������ ������ / ������ 27-12-2010 ### Executive Summary The next two weeks will be slow as much of the Washington think tank community take off for the holidays. In the meantime, the focus is the lame-duck congress, which is pressing the passage of several bills before the new, Republican congress takes power in early January. The one bill to have a foreign policy impact is the ratification of the START Treaty, which appears to be assured, given a test vote earlier this week. The Think Tank Monitor will look at this in more depth next week. The Monitor was going to look at the formation of the new Iraq government, but last minute hitches have made the final outcome unknown. As a result, we are looking at the reapportionment of congressional representation in the United States as a result of the recent census. The results came out this week, and they will have an impact on the next Congress in 2012 and the next presidential election. In papers that came out this week: The Heritage Foundation is optimistic about the War in Afghanistan. They maintain the Afghanistan strategy is on the right track, and the recent security gains are encouraging. They say the Administration should now double down on efforts to bolster political reconciliation inside Afghanistan and strengthen regional diplomacy to bring Afghanistan�s neighbors in alignment with a serious reconciliation process. The Brookings Institution looked at the White House review on Afghanistan and Pakistan. They conclude, �There are enormous challenges ahead in every aspect of this conflict. We still do not have as many qualified trainers on the ground helping to build the Afghan security forces as we need, which is our ticket to bringing home our troops. The complex regional diplomacy to reopen Indo-Pakistani dialogue which would affect the Pakistani army�s calculus has yet to really begin, although the president's trip to New Delhi last month was a start. The White House is right to be modest but also right to stay on course. The American Foreign Policy Council looks at the recent talks on Iran�s nuclear program. They pessimistically note, �Tehran isn't content to simply drag out its diplomatic dialogue with the West; it wants to change the terms of the debate itself. That is why, in a brazen piece of political theater, the Iranian regime has proposed the creation of a "6+1" group (encompassing the five permanent UN Security Council members, Germany and Iran itself) as a replacement for the current negotiating quintet. The scheme, Ahmadinejad himself made clear, is simply inevitable. "Iran will never compromise on the rights of its nation to nuclear fuel cycle, 20-percent uranium enrichment and construction of power plants," the Iranian president has said publicly. "The West had better cooperate with Iran on the nuclear issue." Needless to say, making Iran an equal partner in the international consensus regarding whether to apply pressure on its own nuclear program is the foreign policy equivalent of allowing the fox to guard the henhouse. The Farsi word for "chutzpah," incidentally, is jesarat. If the latest diplomatic feints from Tehran are any indication, the Iranians have more than enough to go around.� Meanwhile, the Washington Institute looks at the friction in Iran between its supreme religious leader and the President. They conclude, �Khamenei has never been willing to tolerate a president with a large independent power base. In the past, he clipped the wings of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who had strong ties to the merchant class, and of Mohammad Khatami, a reformer whose support came from Westernized middle-class professionals. Though Ahmadinejad received the Supreme Leader's support in the face of large-scale protests against his re-election last year, Khamenei does not appear hesitant about limiting the president's power� More importantly for the international community, this internal struggle keeps Iran's leaders from realistically appraising their foreign and nuclear policies. Consumed with their test of wills, they are unable to make well-informed and nuanced decisions in their dealings with outsiders. The CSIS takes a very frank look at the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). The report says, �The QDDR should have been a frank and critical effort that examined case studies in the failure to plan for effective civil and stability operations before each war, to execute effective civil operations during the initial invasions, and to develop and improve programs in the years that followed. Instead it fails to address problems that have denied the military the civil partners they need to effectively support both wars�Far too much of the 19 page QDDR Executive Summary is little more than a collection of buzzwords like �civilian power,� �21st Century challenges,� etc.. Its recommendations are little more than a morass of new organizational initiatives (and growth) within the State Department, conceptual slogans, and self-seeking politically correct rhetoric.� CSIS also looks at intelligence sharing in order to track nuclear weapons programs in North Korea and Iran. They note, �One possible improvement to the IAEA�s monitoring and verification regime would be enhancing the IAEA�s use of intelligence by formalizing cooperation with a multilateral security organization such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Working through NATO, which has established procedures and infrastructure for sharing and disseminating classified information, would avoid many problems that occur in bilateral intelligence-sharing. While collaboration with NATO may raise concerns about the impartiality of the IAEA among its non-NATO members, effective internal checks on such a relationship may help alleviate these concerns. This is preferred to having the IAEA developing its own intelligence gathering capability, which would face significant legal, political, and practical barriers.� The American Enterprise Institute looks at security in the Indo-Pacific region. They note, �Ensuring security in the Indo-Pacific region will be the primary foreign policy challenge for the United States and liberal nations over the next generation. Doing so successfully will provide the greatest economic and political opportunities for the next quarter century. Conversely, a failure to maintain stability, support liberal regimes, create cooperative regional relations, and uphold norms and standards of international behavior will lead to a region, and world, of greater uncertainty, insecurity, and instability. Due to its economic strength, military power, and political dynamism, the Indo-Pacific will be the world's most important region in coming decades, and its significance will be felt throughout the globe. Since the end of World War II, it has transformed itself into the world's economic powerhouse, yet has also witnessed a struggle between tides of liberalism, authoritarianism, and even totalitarianism. It remains riven by distrust, territorial disputes, ethnic tensions, and painful historical memories.� The Carnegie Endowment looks at the growing number of youth in Egypt and the instability they pose to that nation if their needs are not met. They recommend better education that focuses on business skills, economic and political opportunities for young women, encouraging entrepreneurship amongst the young, and greater political opportunities for youth. ### ANALYSIS: Congressional Reapportionment The figures from the census, which is done every ten years, are in and the results show that the Republicans will go into the next presidential election with an edge. For instance, if the 2008 presidential election were held today with the new electoral college votes, McCain would get 6 more electoral votes than he did in 2008. That is not enough to win, but in close races like 2000, it does give the Republican a serious advantage. This makes the mathematics for a Republican presidential candidate much easier in 2012. Assume that the 2012 Republican nominee wins four traditionally GOP-leaning states that Obama won in 2008: Virginia (13 electoral votes), Indiana (11 electoral votes), North Carolina (15 electoral votes) and Florida (now 29 electoral votes). Add in the one electoral vote in Nebraska that Obama won by 1.1 percent. Add in the six net votes from the 2008 McCain states, and that puts the Republican at 248 electoral votes, needing another 22. Those 22 votes could be won in a variety of ways, but the most likely scenario would appear to be Ohio (18 electoral votes) and any other state (Iowa, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania). Since several of these states went Republican in the mid term elections, that is a very likely scenario. While Obama won Ohio in 2008, it is normally considered a Republican state. It went Republican in statewide elections in 2010. Obama also won Florida in 2008, but that will almost certainly flip back to the GOP after Democrats got trounced in statewide elections there, too, in November. Not noticed in the report was the fact that California kept the same number of electoral votes. This is the first time in the nearly 160 year history of that state that it didn�t gain in electoral votes in the census. It reflects a stagnant economy and a mass migration of workers to economically more vibrant states like Texas. The new figures will also impact the congressional races in 2012 since the GOP won many more state houses and governorships. This gives the Republican more control of the redistricting process, which gives them more power to shape the new congressional districts to their advantage. For instance, the surge in Republican support, and GOP control of Florida and Texas is well-timed. They could or should take at least five of the six new seats give to those two states. On the other side, some Democrats will be forced to fight each other to stay in office thanks to the shrinkage in some Democratic states. There�s no way Massachusetts lawmakers can avoid pitting two Democrats against each other in a primary; their state�s delegation is all-Democrat. On the other hand, New Jersey Democrats will probably try to use their loss of one congressional seat to take out the one Republican in the delegation. The biggest winner is Texas, which received four additional congressional seats. And, although some are insisting that the seats will be Democratic since much of the growth is from Hispanics, it appears that they will be Republican, even if the population is Hispanic. In November, several South Texas Hispanic Republicans won election to county posts and even the Legislature. Just days ago, a South Texas Hispanic legislator switched from the Democratic to the Republican Party, where he professed to feel more at home. A majority of Hispanics may not soon turn Republican, but the goal of absorbing a third or 40 percent or even more is well within Republicans' reach. This is a nightmare for Texas Democrats. Not only do Republicans control the state government in advance of redistricting, they enjoy a large enough advantage now to push through any kind of redistricting they want. They will restructure the state�s districts to further entrench Republican power, and that gives the GOP an even greater boost in 2012. Given the large gains made by the GOP in statehouses in the midterms, it puts the Democrats squarely on the defense for reapportionment in many states. ### Think Tanks Publications: Heritage Foundation Afghan Review Shows Troop Surge Working By Lisa Curtis and James Phillips, Web Memo December 17, 2010 The White House review on Afghanistan released Thursday demonstrates that the 30,000 additional U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan this year are beginning to make a difference in the direction of the war. In order to build on these tentative gains, the Administration should take a stronger leadership role in driving political reconciliation inside Afghanistan, intensify efforts to work with Pakistan in denying Taliban sanctuary on its side of the border, and refrain from discussing troop deadlines, which undermines the overall strategy. Read more ### Center for Strategic and International Studies The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review By Anthony Cordesman December 21, 2010 There are times to be polite about a dismal bureaucratic failure. Wartime is not one of them. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) has many useful ideas but it fails to address the legacy of nearly a decade of failure on the part of the State Department, USAID, and the civil departments of the US government to come to grips with the need to provide effective civilian partners in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. A new report from the Burke chair reviwes the strengths and weaknesses of the QDDR in detail. Read more ### Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Shining a Brighter Light on Dark Places: Improving the IAEA�s Use of Intelligence through Cooperation with NATO By Michael Hertzberg December 21, 2010 As North Korea and Iran have recently demonstrated, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Safeguards Regime have not been completely effective in preventing the diversion of nuclear technology for military purposes by non-nuclear powers. Although the enactment of the Additional Protocol has strengthened the Safeguards Regime, there are still opportunities for would-be proliferators to clandestinely develop nuclear technology for military application in violation of the NPT. One possible improvement to the IAEA�s monitoring and verification regime would be enhancing the IAEA�s use of intelligence by formalizing cooperation with a multilateral security organization such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Read more ### American Enterprise Institute Security in the Indo-Pacific Commons By Michael Auslin December 15, 2010 The interests of the United States and its allies and partners lie in protecting the Indo-Pacific commons from any disruption that would cause political tension or conflict, adversely affect global economic activity, or hinder the access of any nation to the rest of the region and globe for political or military reasons. However, as a result of China's military buildup in particular, the United States and its allies can no longer be assured of maintaining regional superiority of forces either numerically or, eventually, qualitatively. The comprehensive buildup of Chinese military power should be recognized as a tool for the broader geopolitical expansion of Chinese influence, providing the means necessary to achieve regional acceptance of Chinese aims, however those may be defined in the future. Read more ### Carnegie Endowment Concerns of Egyptian Youth: A Forgotten Majority By Lahcen Achy December 21, 2010 The Egyptian youth represent the majority of Egypt�s population and share a sense of detachment from, and lack of trust in, the country�s political life. They dream of a decent and stable job, affordable housing, and good health services. As a result of the political stalemate, one out four of them sees emigration rather than political engagement as the solution to their problems�a few turn to radicalism. Nine out of ten jobless in Egypt are under age 30, with women disproportionately unemployed. Only 50 percent of young males and 10 percent of young females find a job within two years after leaving school. As a result, these youth spend years�sometimes lifetimes�waiting for a job that matches their skills and meets their pay expectations. In the meantime, they are forced to delay marriage and childbearing, and live longer with their parents. Statistics show that 60 percent of males and 47 percent of females remain unmarried beyond the age of 30. Read more ### American Foreign Policy Council The Audacity Of Nope By IIan Berman December 21, 2010 How do you say "chutzpah" in Farsi? That's the question many observers of Iranian politics must be asking in the wake of the latest, hollow round of international diplomacy over the Islamic Republic's nuclear program. The two-day meeting which took place between Tehran and Western powers in Geneva in early December may have been heavy on pomp and circumstance, but it was remarkably devoid of substance. Ahead of the talks, Iranian officials had made abundantly clear that they weren't prepared to discuss the main point of discord between their government and the West�their regime's nuclear ambitions. True to their word, the dialogue that followed skirted the substantive issues relating to Iran's persistent nuclear effort, serving simply to set the stage for more in-depth discussions which are ostensibly to follow in the future. Read more ### Institute for the Study of War Order of Battle for Afghanistan and Iraq December 21, 2010 1 - Afghan order of battle 2 - Iraq order of battle ### Washington Institute for Near East Policy Iran's Supreme Power Struggle By Mehdi Khalaji December 16, 2010 Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has never been happy about the status of the Iranian presidency -- neither during his own tenure, from 1981-1989, nor during the terms of his three successors. Tension between the president and the Supreme Leader is built into the Islamic Republic's core. The Supreme Leader has absolute authority and can veto decisions made by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. At the same time, the president emerges from an electoral process with an agenda and ambitions of his own. During a president's second term -- which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has now begun -- the tensions inevitably emerge into public view. Read more ### Brookings Institution Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy Should Stay the Course By Bruce Riedel December 16, 2010 The White House is being appropriately modest in describing the progress of President Obama�s strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We are far from being on the edge of anything anyone would describe as success in south Asia. Yet at the same time we are no longer close to the precipice of defeat and strategic disaster as we were when the president inherited the war in January 2009. At that time the al Qaeda core leadership in the border lands on the Pakistani-Afghan border was under minimal pressure and planning new attacks on America, their Afghan Taliban allies had the momentum in much of Afghanistan and were gobbling up territory across the south and east of the country rapidly, and we had just witnessed the worst terror attack in the world since 911 in Mumbai, India. In both Afghanistan and Pakistan Obama inherited disasters because American foreign policy had failed to develop effective strategies for both countries and to resource them properly. Read more ### |
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